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1Abstract
This paper examines the relationship between the environmental and
economic performance of ￿rms in the European paper manufacturing indus-
t r y . B a s e do np a n e ld a t a ,i t￿rst investigates the relationship separately,
with the analysis based on four hypotheses formulated with regard to coun-
try in￿uence, process in￿uence and ￿rm size in￿uence on environmental and
economic performance. Hypotheses are tested using pooled regression and
a panel regression framework with random ￿rm and temporal eﬀects. The
main results of this analysis based on separated regressions are that (i) only
for a direct comparison between the UK and Germany, country eﬀects are
found to be consistent with the hypotheses, i.e. German ￿rms have better
environmental, but worse economic performance than UK ￿rms, (ii) there
is a signi￿cant sub-sector eﬀect on environmental performance only, (iii)
eﬀectively no signi￿cant ￿rm size eﬀect can be detected. Subsequent to
analysing the relationship separately, the paper estimates the determinants
of the relationship between environmental and economic performance using
three simultaneous equations systems. It was found that for the system
with return on sales as economic performance variable, and an environmen-
tal performance index as environmental performance variable, a signi￿cant
and positive regression coeﬃcient was estimated for the asset-turnover ratio,
as well as signi￿cant and negative coeﬃcients for the dummy variables repre-
senting the industrial and mixed sub-sector. For the system with return on
capital employed and the environmental index, signi￿cant and positive coef-
￿cients were found for the latter, both linear and squared. This last ￿nding
￿ts better with ￿traditionalist￿ reasoning about the relationship between
environmental and economic performance, which predicts the relationship
to be uniformly negative.
Key words: Economic performance; Environmental performance; Paper
industry; Simultaneous equations system; Three-error-components model
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21I n t r o d u c t i o n
The relationship between environmental and economic performance (i.e.
short-term pro￿tability and longer-term competitiveness) of ￿rms is an im-
portant issue for environmental policy making. In the current discussion
about this relationship, it is often argued that there is a con￿ict between
competitiveness of ￿rms and their environmental performance (Walley and
Whitehead, 1994). For example, at the level of a speci￿c industry, the share
of environmental costs in total manufacturing costs might be considerably
higher than average (Luken et al., 1996). Particularly, this might be the case
for industries upstream in the production chain (such as primary resource
extraction or primary manufacturing), which have been shown to give rise
to environmental impacts disproportionate to the value added associated
with their production activities (Clift, 1998). It has therefore often been
argued that ￿rms in such industries with higher environmental compliance
costs face a competitive disadvantage. Given that in the past, ￿rms have
focused on end-of-pipe technologies as the major approach towards pollu-
tion control and environmental performance improvements in general, in the
￿traditionalist￿ view, environmental investments were often seen as an extra
cost (Cohen et al., 1995).
Only recently, the notion emerged that improved environmental perfor-
mance is a potential source for competitive advantage as it can lead to more
eﬃcient processes, improvements in productivity, lower costs of compliance
and new market opportunities (Porter, 1991, Porter and van der Linde, 1995,
and Schmidheiny, 1992), although this often refers to other aspects of en-
vironmental performance than those addressed and measured traditionally
(Wehrmeyer and Tyteca, 1998). Two major reasons to underpin this ar-
gument exist. Firstly, companies facing higher costs for polluting activities
have an incentive to research new technologies and production approaches
that can ultimately reduce the costs of compliance. But innovations also
result in lower production costs, e.g. lower input costs due to enhanced re-
source productivity (Porter and Esty, 1998). Secondly, companies can gain
￿￿rst mover advantages￿ from selling their new solutions and innovations
to other ￿rms (Porter and Esty, 1998). In a dynamic, longer-term perspec-
3tive, the ability to innovate and to develop new technologies and production
approaches is likely a more important determinant of competitiveness than
traditional factors of competitive advantage, e.g. low-cost production, or
generally comparative cost advantages of a country (Porter and van der
Linde, 1995). This position can be termed the ￿revisionist￿ view.
So far, the relationships between environmental and economic perfor-
mance and its determinants have rarely been analysed in practice, partly
due to data constraints, partly due to a far-from-well-developed theoretical
framework. This paper attempts to discuss a number of important deter-
minants for the above relationship in order to develop hypotheses on their
expected in￿uence. These determinants are initially though to be the coun-
t r yl o c a t i o no fa￿rm, the industrial sub-sector it operates in, and the ￿rm
size. For example, country-level regulation and innovation initiatives are
considered to have an in￿uence on the relationship between environmental
and economic performance. Also, technological progress in industrial sectors
and sub-sectors is considered an important determinant that simultaneously
in￿uences the environmental and economic performance of a ￿r m ,a si st h e
￿rm￿s size. This obviously raises the question whether the theoretical propo-
sitions made with regard to key determinants of the relationship between
environmental and economic performance can be supported by empirical
evidence.
This paper therefore empirically analyses the in￿uence of the aforemen-
tioned determinants on the environmental and economic performance of
￿rms in the European Union in a de￿ned industrial sector. For this pur-
pose, data has been collected from corporate environmental reports and
emission inventories for the paper manufacturing industry in the Nether-
lands, Italy, Germany and the UK during the EU-funded project ￿Measur-
ing Environmental Performance of Industry (MEPI)￿.1 In parallel, ￿nancial
1The project has been funded under the 4th Framework Programme (Environment
and Climate) of DGXII of the European Commission. Further information on MEPI
can be found at http://www.environmental-performance.org. MEPI was coordinated by
the Science Policy Research Unit ￿ SPRU, University of Sussex, UK. The research has
also been conducted by the Centre Entreprise-SociØtØ-Environnement ￿ CEE, UniversitØ
Catholique de Louvain, Belgium; the Institute for Environmental Studies, Vrije Univesiteit
Amsterdam, Netherlands, the Department of Economics and Production, Politecnico di
4information for the same set of ￿rms, for which environmental performance
data has been collected, has been extracted from ￿nancial databases in a
comparable format for an number of accounting-based ￿nancial indicators.
B a s e do nt h i sd a t as e tf o raw e l l - d e ￿ned industrial sector (the paper man-
ufacturing industry), the paper analyses what factors determine to which
degree the environmental and economic performance of ￿rms, as well as the
relationship between the latter two. Results of this research will inform en-
vironmental policy making in more detail about the factors which should
best be in￿uenced in order to achieve a high eﬀectiveness and eﬃciency of
policy measures. At the same time results also provide an indication about
the potential homogeneity or heterogeneity of determinants. This latter
point seems to be speci￿cally relevant for environmental policy, since it can
provide an indication about the degree to which policy measures need to be
diﬀerentiated depending on the country, sub-sector or ￿rm population under
consideration.
Our empirical analysis involves an estimation procedure based on: (i)
a three-error-components panel data model for estimating separately the
determinants of economic performance and environmental performance; (ii)
a simultaneous equations system to account for the structural relationship
characterizing the joint determination of economic performance and environ-
mental performance. The main results emerging from separated regressions
are that (i) only for a direct comparison between the UK and Germany, coun-
try eﬀects are found to be consistent with the hypotheses, i.e. German ￿rms
have better environmental, but worse economic performance than UK ￿rms,
(ii) there is a signi￿cant sub-sector eﬀect on environmental performance only,
(iii) eﬀectively no signi￿cant ￿rm size eﬀect can be detected. Subsequent
to analysing the relationship separately, the paper uses three simultaneous
equations systems. It was found that for the system with return on sales
as economic performance variable, and an environmental performance index
as environmental performance variable, a signi￿cant and positive regression
coeﬃcient was estimated for the asset-turnover ratio, as well as signi￿cant
Milano, Italy; the Institut f￿r ￿kologische Wirtschaftsforschung ￿ I￿W, Austria; the
Institute for Prospective Technological Studies ￿ IPTS, Sevilla, Spain, and the Centre for
Environmental Strategy ￿ CES, University of Surrey, UK.
5and negative coeﬃcients for the dummy variables representing the industrial
and mixed sub-sector. For the system with return on capital employed and
the environmental index, signi￿cant and positive coeﬃcients were found for
the latter, both linear and squared.
The paper is organised as follows: literature overview and theoretical
concepts motivating our own empirical approach are discussed in Section
2; the data collection methodology and sample description are presented in
Section 3; the econometric models used are described in Section 4; estimation
results are reported in Section 5. Section 6 concludes the study.
2 Overview and theoretical concepts
Based on these two contrasting positions described in the previous section,
two speci￿cations of the phenomenological relationship between the two con-
cepts of environmental performance (measured e.g. in terms of resource con-
sumption and emission levels) and economic performance (measured e.g. in
terms of stock market performance or ￿nancial ratios) can be proposed. A
￿rst possible speci￿cation would be that the relationship between the two is
uniformly negative. This re￿ects the ￿traditionalist￿ view presented above
and is theoretically rooted in standard microeconomic theory, since pollu-
tion abatement measures in this theory are predicted to increase production
costs and are assumed to have increasing marginal costs (e.g. pollution
abatement and environmental performance improvements are assumed to
have decreasing marginal bene￿ts and increasing marginal costs). This situ-
ation is depicted in Figure 1a below , where high environmental performance
(e.g., low normalised emissions and inputs) correspond to low economic per-
formance (i.e. low normalised pro￿tability or market performance) and vice
versa.2 Generally, economic performance would be required, under the cir-
cumstances of Figure 1a, to be monotonously decreasing with increasing
environmental performance, i.e. the ￿rst derivative (of economic perfor-
2In the ￿gures, environmental performance can be either an aggregate index of emis-
sions and inputs, or an environmental rating and economic performance can be an indi-
vidual ￿nancial ratio (return on sales or assets, value added per employee) or an aggregate
index of ￿nancial or economic performance of a ￿rm.
6mance diﬀerentiated to environmental performance) is always negative. In
addition to that, the second derivative is required to be negative, repre-
senting an increasing negative marginal impact of increasing environmental
performance on economic performance.
Figure 1 about here
However, the relationship between environmental and economic perfor-
mance of ￿rms does not have to be unidirectional, but can be changing
from positive to negative or vice versa. A second possible speci￿cation for
t h er e l a t i o n s h i pw o u l dt h e r e f o r eb ea ni n v e r s e l yU - s h a p e dc u r v ea c r o s st h e
environmental performance spectrum. Such a speci￿cation would also be
theoretically supported by standard microeconomic theory, but would also
be taking into account the innovation aspects brought forward in the ￿revi-
sionist￿ perspective. Based on this the relationship between environmental
and economic performance can be represented through a bell-shaped (i.e.
inversely U-shaped) curve. It is upward-sloping for ￿rms with environmen-
tal performance below the optimum (which is the point where economic
performance is maximised). This means that the bene￿ts reaped from in-
creased environmental performance increase continuously for low levels of
environmental performance. This curve holds up to a certain point around
or slightly above average environmental performance.3 Beyond this point,
the relationship is likely represented by a downward sloping curve (which
in a ￿rst approximation is considered to be fairly linear). Taken together,
the shape of the relationship over the whole spectrum of environmental
performance encountered would be an inversely U-shaped curve with an
optimum point (i.e. a level of environmental performance, where the ben-
e￿ts for economic performance net the costs for achieving this level are
maximised over the whole spectrum). Schaltegger and Figge (2000) have
expanded on this, pointing out that the discussed relationship in general is
neither positive, nor negative. They consider the relation to follow a gener-
3It is an interesting question, where exactly the optimum (i.e. economically eﬃcient)
level of environmental performance lies, since this would shed considerable light on the
degree to which ￿pollution prevention pays￿. However, this is beyond the scope of this
exposition of possible speci￿cations.
7alised bell-shaped/inversely U-shaped curve with a monotonously decreasing
￿rst derivative and a negative second derivative (i.e. an increasing negative
marginal impact on economic performance from increasing environmental
performance). The part of the curve which lies to the left of its maximum
(i.e. the optimum level of environmental performance which corresponds to
maximum economic performance) is characterised by a positive ￿rst deriva-
tive and a negative second derivative. The part of the curve which lies to
the right of its maximum is characterised by a negative ￿rst derivative and
a negative second derivative. This speci￿cation of the relationship (a syn-
thesis of the ￿traditionalist￿ and ￿revisionist￿ views) is depicted in Figure
1b.4
These considerations allow to conclude that economic theories (particu-
larly standard microeconomic theory and the theoretical reasoning behind
the Porter hypothesis) propose the generalised relationship between environ-
mental and economic performance to be a inversely U-shaped (i.e. concave)
relationship, as depicted in Figure 1b. Following the argument above by
Schaltegger and Synnestvedt (1999) a generalised bell-shaped/inversely U-
shaped curve would represent the ￿best￿ possible case for the relationship
between environmental and economic performance, since it allows for the ex-
istence of win-win situations with pro￿table (in the short-term) environmen-
tal performance improvement activities. On the other hand, a monotonously
falling curve would represent the ￿traditionalist￿ view. This would corre-
spond to a situation where at the phenomenological level environmental
performance improvements can only increase costs and reduce pro￿ts. Un-
der such conditions, the optimal level of environmental performance would
be that prescribed by environmental regulations, i.e. compliance.
However, the interaction of environmental and economic performance
(being represented at a very aggregated level by the phenomenological rela-
tionship between the two concepts as discussed so far) is in a causality per-
spective (i.e. regarding the causes of the relationship) most likely indirect,
through factors in￿uencing either environmental or economic performance,
or both and should thus be perceived as the outcome of a complex process
4T h ee n v i r o n m e n t a lp e r f o r m a n c ea n dt h ee c o n o m i cp e r f o r m a n c ea x i sa r ed e ￿ned as in
Footnote 2.
8of interaction and in￿uence. In this process, the in￿uence factors have a
causal relationship to environmental and/or economic performance. Prior
to generating hypotheses with regard to individual factors, the interaction
between environmental and economic performance needs to be discussed in
more detail. In order to do so, a more general model linking 1) in￿uence
factors, 2) environmental performance, and 3) economic performance needs
to be developed. Therefore, in Figure 2, a model is shown for the inter-
action between in￿uence factors, environmental performance and economic
performance. In this model, the ￿phenomenological￿ relationship is related
to the in￿uence of moderating factors discussed above. The ￿phenomeno-
logical￿ relationship between environmental and economic performance is
represented at the top level of the model. This is, what is observable (e.g.
by way of a scatterplot of individual environmental performance indicators
against ￿nancial indicators).
The model in Figure 2 shows the factors considered most important
which cause a certain level of environmental and economic performance.
In the most general form it should be assumed that each of these factors
have a simultaneous in￿uence on environmental and economic performance.
However, it may well be possible that each factor can be considered to have
a predominant in￿uence on either environmental or economic performance,
since the key factors in￿uencing most directly and strongly environmental
performance are possibly relatively distinct to these that in￿uence economic
performance.
Figure 2 about here
Next to the diﬀerent in￿uences (in terms of directness and strength) the
factors at the bottom of Figure 2 have on environmental and economic per-
formance, there are two more noteworthy aspects. Firstly, the in￿uencing
factors also interact amongst each other. For example, ￿rm size can have
an in￿uence on corporate environmental strategies/management: it is often
argued that small ￿rms are laggards who have a relatively reactive stance
towards environmental management (Bradford, 2000). As well country lo-
cation (via environmental regulation) can have an in￿uence on the processes
operated: for example in Germany, the Kraft pulping process is indirectly
9prohibited through very stringent emission limits for pulp manufacturers,
whereas in other countries, limits are not as strict and thus operation of the
Kraft process is possible (Ganzleben, 1998, p. 24). If the in￿uences and
interaction between any two in￿uencing factors are very direct and/or very
strong, this needs to be taken into account. They can only be neglected,
if the interaction between any two factors are very weak and very indirect
compared with the in￿uences each moderating factor has on environmental
and/or economic performance.
Secondly, a number of additional factors need to be considered which
have an in￿uence exclusively on economic performance. Amongst these are
investors and their expectations of return, changing market conditions with
regard to demand, supply and prices, the cyclic nature and/or the average
capital intensity of the industries under consideration. Given these poten-
tial in￿uences mainly on economic performance, the model described above
m i g h th a v et ob ee x p a n d e da sd e p i c t e di nF i g u r e3 .
Figure 3 about here
As can be seen in the model in Figure 3, the additional factors which
mainly have an in￿uence on economic performance can potentially also in-
￿uence the set of in￿uencing factors introduced in Figure 2 (which are con-
sidered to in￿uence environmental and economic performance), hence, this
interaction needs to be taken into account as well.
Based on the two models developed above, several hypotheses can be
d e r i v e dw i t hr e g a r dt ot h em o s ti m p o r t a n ti n ￿uence factors in￿uencing the
relationship (environmental management, industry structure, processes op-
erated, ￿rm size and in￿uence of regulation). In the following, the relevant
in￿uencing factors considered relevant in the ￿r s tm o d e l( F i g u r e2 )s h a l l
therefore be discussed in more detail in order to justify their theoretical rel-
evance, particularly that they are likely to be the most important factors
in￿uencing environmental performance. In the following, hypotheses are
therefore formulated regarding the in￿uence of these factors on environmen-
tal and economic performance, respectively. This will concern the following
factors necessary to explain (at least part of) the full variance encountered
in the data set with regard to the relationship between environmental and
10economic performance: (i) country location (which proxies for level and
eﬃciency of regulation in an industry), (ii) processes operated (which are
proxied at least partly by individual ￿rm eﬀects), and (iii) ￿rm size.5
The in￿uence of the industry market structure/sector membership can-
not be assessed with the data set at hand, since this only comprises of
￿rms in the paper manufacturing sector in the EU. The additional factors
in Figure 3 will also not be considered, since they are either industry- or
country-related. In the former case they are assumed to be constant in their
in￿uence (since only the paper manufacturing sector is considered). In the
latter case, they are captured in the country dummy variables included in
the regressions.
￿ Country location
Country-level in￿uences on the relationship between environmental and
economic performance have so far often been excluded from the analysis,
partly due to the dominance of US-based studies (focusing on only one
country). To better understand the relationship between environmental
and economic performance, a Europe-based study therefore seems neces-
sary and timely. Country location proxies jointly for a number of in￿uences.
This can e.g. be the level of stringency of environmental regulations, the
type of instruments used to implement these (e.g. economic instruments, or
command-and-control legislation) which has an in￿uence on the eﬃciency of
environmental regulation in diﬀerent countries, or the level of general busi-
ness taxes in the country. The joint in￿uence of these factors is captured in
the country location. It is very well possible that the relationship between
environmental and economic performance at the ￿rm level is aﬀected by dif-
fering country in￿uences, if ￿rms are not all located within one country. In
such a case, country in￿uence needs to be examined closely prior to drawing
5The in￿uence of environmental management systems was not included in the analyses
reported here, since there is evidence for the data set used, that it is not a good measure,
since ￿rms have no signi￿cantly diﬀerent environmental performance, regardless of whether
they have a certi￿ed Environmental Management System (EMS) or not (Wagner et al.,
2001). In addition to that, for 1995, none of the ￿rms in the data set had a certi￿ed
EMS. Also, it is theoretically possible that ￿rms without a certi￿ed EMS carry out the
same environmental management activities as those which are certi￿ed. Nevertheless,
information on EMS has been included in Table 2 below.
11conclusions for a complete set of ￿rms from diﬀerent countries.
The most important factor in the context of this research is likely the
regulatory regime in a country in general and for speci￿c industries, i.e. the
strictness of an approach to environmental legislation and regulation.6
If it is accepted that country in￿uences on the relationship between en-
vironmental and economic performance result from the fact that in diﬀerent
countries the stringency of, as well as the approach to (and thus the eﬃ-
ciency of) environmental (and to a lesser degree other) regulation may diﬀer,
then under the assumption that ￿rms are compliance-oriented (and not over-
compliant) it can be expected that the level of environmental performance
(i.e. the emission levels) of a ￿rm is (linear) proportional to the stringency
of environmental regulation (which can be measured as, e.g., the average
level of emission standards in a country).7 The reason for this relationship
between stringency of regulation and environmental performance is that ini-
tially it only pays for ￿rms to pursue emission reductions until they meet
the emission standards for their industry, since only such reductions yield an
economic bene￿tf o r￿rms in terms of minimizing their compliance costs by
avoiding ￿nes. In a compliance-oriented situation, the environmental per-
formance of a ￿rm (measured in terms of its emissions) can be considered as
a ￿revealed regulatory stringency￿ (as opposed to a ￿stated regulatory strin-
gency￿ as expressed by emissions standards). A situation of over-compliance
is unlikely, since over-compliance would only be rational for ￿rms if it can be
achieved through cost-eﬀective pollution abatement measures. Most cost-
eﬀective measures have however amortisation periods of more than 2 years
so that annualised returns can usually not compete with other investment
6A third important aspect is the degree of certainty, in a country, regarding the future
development of environmental regulation. This aspect is however very diﬃcult to capture
and is therefore excluded in this paper.
7The same situation applies equally to sectoral diﬀerences in regulation. For example,
Henriques and Sadorsky (1996) argue that costs of regulation diﬀer across industries, and
that ￿￿rms in more regulated industries are more likely to embed environmental issues into
their management strategies since the costs associated with non-compliance tend to be
signi￿cantly higher￿ (p. 385). Nevertheless, diﬀerences with regard to regulation seem to
be much more pronounced between countries, since within one country usually one speci￿c
regulatory body and process produces environmental regulation for various industries.
12options. In addition to that, over-compliance needs a ￿rm￿s careful consid-
eration since it could signal to regulators a scope for tighter environmen-
tal regulations without signi￿cantly aﬀecting companies￿ pro￿tability and
competitiveness. Therefore over-compliance can be expected to be the ex-
ception, rather than the norm. Nevertheless, the eﬀect of distortions from
over-compliance (resulting, for example from ￿rms￿ anticipation of future
tightening of regulations) needs to be taken into account and assessed prior
to assuming the above relationship between stringency and performance.
Next to the strictness/stringency of environmental regulation, it is also
necessary to consider the eﬃciency of regulation depending on the instru-
ments used. From the point of economic theory it is usually argued that
the use of economic instruments is more eﬃcient than a command-and-
control approach. For example, some countries have generally a very strong
legal stance in their environmental regulation, whereas others lean more
towards economic instruments, such as taxes or subsidies, and yet others
tend to prefer voluntary or negotiated agreements. Germany, the UK and
the Netherlands would be respective examples. However, it is at times dif-
￿cult to distinguish such regimes clearly, since governments usually apply
a mix of economic, legal and voluntary or negotiation-based instruments
simultaneously. However, it has also to be taken into account, to what de-
gree regulations are designed and implemented eﬃciently and are enforced
properly.8
In Germany and the UK, the extent of corporate environmental protec-
tion has increased signi￿cantly over the last decade. The socio-political, reg-
ulatory and economic climates of the two countries show clearly diﬀerences,
which has meant that companies in each country have developed manage-
ment approaches and corporate environmental strategies that are speci￿c
to their national circumstance, with likely diﬀerent in￿uences on the envi-
ronmental and economic performance of ￿rms. For instance, Gordon (1994)
acknowledges that, whilst awareness of broader political and social aspects
8This is a particularly important issue, since properly designed environmental regula-
tion in the Porter hypothesis is expected to produce organisational and technical innova-
tions which lead to production eﬃciency gains that can result in competitive advantages
compared to less stringent regulation (Porter and van der Linde, 1995).
13in environmental policy is greater in Britain, the level of analysis and the
eﬃciency of environmental policy making is often greater in Germany. Peat-
tie and Ringer (1994) report strong enthusiasm for environmental manage-
ment amongst British companies, and suggest that in organisational terms,
they are not signi￿cantly lagging behind, but may increasingly do so due to
weak environmental legislation. James et al. (1997) ￿nd that for speci￿c
socio-political dimensions, such as stringency of regulation, the character
of existing competitive strategies within ￿rms, or the level and quality of
public concern for environmental issues, have led to distinct environmental
management types in both countries, with likely diﬀerent in￿uences on en-
vironmental and economic performance, and, ipso facto, the relationship of
the latter two.
Compared to Germany and the UK, in the Netherlands, two key trends
in Dutch policy in￿uenced the situation with regards to European Eco-
Management and Auditing Scheme (EMAS). This is ￿rstly the strong stance
for deregulation (also concerning environmental regulation) in the early as
well as the rising level of political and public environmental awareness in
the late 1980s (W￿tzold et al., 2001). Within the Dutch National Envi-
ronmental Policy Plan in particular, this implied two speci￿cn e ws t r a t e -
gies. Firstly, this was the introduction of Environmental Management Sys-
tems (EMS) within industry target groups, and secondly, the negotiation of
agreements (so-called covenants) in which the target groups￿ contributions
to the achievement of various environmental policy goals (e.g., greenhouse
gas emission reductions) were de￿ned (W￿tzold et al., 2001).9
B a s e do nW E Fe ta l . ( 2 0 0 1 ) ,t h es t r i n g e n c yo fr e g u l a t i o na n dt h eo r i -
entation of regulation towards ￿exible instruments (as a proxy for the eﬃ-
ciency of environmental regulation) of the four countries (Germany, Italy,
the Netherlands and the United Kingdom) studied in this paper can be
classi￿ed as in Table 1.
Table 1 about here
9Regulatory relief was granted equally to EMS veri￿ed under EMAS or certi￿ed under
ISO 14001.
14As stated above, with regard to level (i.e. strictness of regulation), eﬃ-
ciency (determined by the approach to regulation) and future development
of environmental regulation, it can therefore be expected that the level of
environmental performance will be higher in countries and sectors with (i) a
higher stringency of environmental regulation (i.e. more stringent emission
standards), and (ii) a more eﬃcient approach to regulation. In particular,
the reason for (ii) is that despite the limitations of the mechanisms proposed
by the Porter hypothesis, it is likely that incentive-based regulations using
economic instruments or voluntary reduce private and social abatement costs
as compared to command-and-control type regulation. Incentive-based reg-
ulations maintain incentives for ￿rms in an industry to reduce emissions,
provide cost-eﬀective allocation of resources and abatement technologies
and therefore at least reduce the negative impact of environmental regu-
lation on ￿rm pro￿tability and competitiveness. Therefore, the following
two hypotheses are proposed:
Hypothesis H1: In countries with more stringent regulation, ￿rms are
expected to have signi￿cantly better environmental performance, as well
as signi￿cantly worse economic performance, than in countries with less
stringent environmental regulation.
Hypothesis H2: In countries, where regulations are more oriented to-
wards economic instruments, environmental, as well as economic perfor-
mance are expected to be more positive than in countries where regulation
is more oriented towards command-and-control type regulation. As a result
of this, the relationship between environmental and economic performance
is expected to be more positive.
￿ Processes operated
Generally, the processes operated at a site are more a classi￿cation cri-
terion, rather than a in￿uencing factor to be hypothesised about, since only
￿rms and sites with fairly comparable processes per se can be compared
with regard to the relationship between environmental and economic per-
formance. Processes operated are therefore operationalised in this research
by means of a broad classi￿cation scheme, in which newsprint, magazine-
grade and graphics ￿ne paper are represented by one category ￿cultural
papers￿, and packaging corrugated and other boards by another category,
15￿industrial papers￿. Also ￿mixed￿ and ￿other￿ categories were de￿ned, re-
sulting in a classi￿cation based on four (broad) sub-sectors . One important
reason for introducing a ￿mixed￿ sub-sector is the fact that the actual unit
determining the product is not the site, but the individual paper machine.
Since one site usually runs more than one paper machine, it is often the case
that two diﬀerent products are produced at that site. A sub-sector category
￿mixed￿ accounts for this. Sub-sector dummy variables were introduced as
control variables since it is assumed that the economic performance of a
￿rm strongly depends on the sub-sector it operates in, and that also envi-
ronmental performance may be in￿uenced by sub-sector membership. Given
this, signi￿cant sub-sector eﬀects can be detected by including a sub-sector
dummy. Therefore, the following hypothesis shall be tested:
Hypothesis H3: The environmental and economic performance of ￿rms in
one industrial sector is expected to vary signi￿cantly across its sub-sectors,
i.e. there are signi￿cant diﬀerences in economic performance, environmental
performance, and, ipso facto, the relationship between environmental and
economic performance is expected to diﬀer signi￿cantly across the diﬀerent
sub-sectors.
￿ Firm size
It is often argued that ￿rm size has an in￿uence on corporate environ-
mental performance, as well as on its relationship with economic perfor-
mance. One reason for this is that ￿rm size can be used to re￿ect ￿rm visi-
bility, and, since larger ￿rms tend to be more susceptible to public scrutiny,
they are more likely to be industry leaders with regard to environmental
performance (Henriques and Sadorsky, 1996). In addition to that, smaller
and medium-sized ￿rms are considered to be in many ways laggards who
have a relatively reactive stance towards environmental management (Brad-
ford, 2000).10 Small and medium-sized ￿rms (SMEs) are often found to be
unaware of their legal duties regarding waste disposal and frequently do not
consider their operations having a signi￿cant environmental impact. In ad-
10Usually, small ￿rms are de￿ned as those with less than 50 employees, whilst medium-
sized companies are considered to be those in the range of 50-250 employees (EIM, 1997, p.
329). Such a de￿nition however needs to account for potential distortions from transitory
growth and size class changes of ￿rms (Wagner, 1995).
16dition to that they tend to be unfamiliar with environmental management
systems and standards and respond strongest to regulation as a stimulus for
environmental improvement (Bradford, 2000, and Meﬀert and Kirchgeorg,
1998).
This experience from a research project looking at Environmental Aware-
ness in SMEs in ￿ve EU countries (Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands, Italy
and the UK) is also supported by a Swedish survey which found in 1998
that small ￿rms with less than 50 employees in Sweden had no signi￿cant
ambition to become environmental leaders although attitude changes were
noted in medium-sized companies above 50 employees, mainly triggered by
the introduction of EMS, customer requirements and organizational change
(Heidenmark and Backman, 1999). Consistent with this empirical experi-
ence it is found that competitiveness is the highest priority for SMEs, whilst
avoidance of legal problems (under which environmental performance can
be subsumed to a large degree due to the fact that SMEs were found to be
mainly compliance- and regulation driven) are ranked very low (Bradford,
2000).
Implied by the above considerations is that, so far, SMEs themselves
mainly perceive the relationship between environmental and economic per-
formance to be negative or at least non-existence, since competitiveness (as
a basis for good economic performance) is not considered to be linked to
legal problems (such as breaches of environmental standards) or is thought
to be con￿icting with the avoidance of legal problems.
Economic theory provides mainly four reasons for diﬀerences in ￿rm
size and thus of diﬀerent levels of market concentration (You, 1995, and
Moschandreas, 1994). These are:
￿ the existence of U-shaped or L-shaped long-term average cost curves,
i.e. a minimum eﬃcient scale of production (MES) exists (the production
theory justi￿cation);
￿ the existence of transaction costs, resulting in a substitution of alloca-
tion mechanisms, i.e. ￿rms as organizational structures instead of markets
(the transaction cost theory-based justi￿cation);
￿ the existence of heterogeneous (monopolistic, incomplete) competi-
tion, i.e. markets with many sellers and diﬀerentiated products (justi￿cation
17based on demand conditions in the market) which postulates niche markets
for small ￿rms; and
￿ the stochastic explanation often modeled as a Gibrat process following
the law of proportionate eﬀect (justi￿cation based on the notion that changes
in concentration are the net eﬀect of a large number of uncertain in￿uences).
Basically these economic approaches to explain diﬀerences in ￿rm size
allow the conclusion that small ￿rms exist where this is not a competitive
disadvantage, e.g. where MES or transaction costs are low, or where the
market structure allows the existence of niche markets. As far as the re-
lationship between environmental and economic performance is considered,
this would imply that from the point of economic theory, no direct explana-
tion is provided as to why the relationship should be less positive for smaller
￿rms than for larger ￿rms (although, as explained above, precisely this is
the self-perception of SMEs).11
Nevertheless (and possibly explaining empirical ￿ndings) it is possible
that for SMEs a less positive relationship exists if there are economies of
scale in environmental management systems and activities. This is well
possible, since environmental management is likely to have a high level of
￿xed (i.e. output- and therefore size-independent) costs. In conclusion, the
following hypothesis is proposed:
Hypothesis H4: Smaller ￿rms are expected to have signi￿cantly lower
average levels of environmental performance as well as higher cross-section
variances in environmental and economic performance than larger ￿rms
(Schmalensee, 1989, p. 986). As a result of this, ￿rm size should have a
signi￿cant positive eﬀect at least on environmental performance. Conse-
quently, the relationship between environmental and economic performance
should be stronger (i.e. more) positive for larger ￿rms, whereas for smaller
￿rms it is likely weaker or even negative since they often cannot achieve
economies of scale in environmental management.
11However, Schmalensee (1989) states that it is a stylised fact that ￿rm size tends to be
negatively related to intertemporal and cross-section variability of pro￿tr a t e s ,a l b e i ta l s o
qualifying this to some degree.
183D a t a
Panel data was collected on a set of 33 paper ￿rms in four EU countries
(Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom) over the period
from 1995 to 1997. The sample covers a considerable proportion of produc-
tion capacity in each country, on average 20% in 1996 and 22% in 1997 (this
is a reasonable response rate for surveys in general). Only in Italy, coverage
is below average. Coverage is best in the Netherlands with approximately
50%. In the UK and in Germany it is around the average.
ISO-certi￿ed and EMAS-veri￿ed ￿rms were distributed across countries
as described in Table 2. In 1995, data on 33 ￿rms was available, of which
none was ISO-certi￿ed or EMAS-veri￿ed in 1995. In 1996, data for 34 ￿rms
was available (of which 1 was excluded due to missing observations in 1995),
whereas in 1997, data on 37 ￿rms was available (of which 4 were excluded
due to missing observations in 1995 and 1996). Since data was also collected
for single-site ￿rms, it is possible that a ￿rm is certi￿ed to ISO as well as
veri￿ed under EMAS. Therefore numbers of ISO and EMAS do not always
add to the total of EMS certi￿cations. Given that not for all ￿rms in all
years data on all variables was available, the number of ￿rms included in
testing the above hypotheses was smaller than the total number of ￿rms
reported in Table 2.
Table 2 about here
C o l l e c t i o no fm o s to ft h ee n v i r o n m e n t a lp e r f o r m a n c ed a t au s e di nt h i s
paper (as well as the data country location, sub-sector, ￿r ms i z ea n do nE M S
certi￿cation) took place in the framework of the project Measuring Environ-
mental Performance of Industry (MEPI). However, additional environmental
performance data was collected by the authors, based on the method used
in the MEPI project (see Berkhout et al., 2001a,b) and incorporated in the
MEPI database.
193.1 Data collection method for environmental performance
data
The main data sources in MEPI for collection of environmental performance
data were corporate environmental reports (all countries except Italy), EMAS
statements (especially Germany and Austria), public pollution inventories
(especially the Netherlands and the UK), and company surveys (especially
Italy). The variety of data sources proved to be problematic in so far that
the sources partly focus on diﬀerent levels of activity. EMAS statements
and pollution inventories for example focus on the site level, whereas corpo-
rate environmental reports usually report data aggregated across a number
of sites. Nevertheless, this is not problematic, since single-site and multi-
site ￿rms can easily be integrated in one research design, as long as system
boundaries for environmental and economic performance match, at least ap-
proximately. Generally, the data collection strategy under the MEPI project
attempted to gather as much information as possible from public sources,
whilst at the same time ￿lling data gaps by direct contact with compa-
nies. Speci￿c national approaches had to be developed, due to the fact that
data availability and data sources varied between countries (Berkhout et al.,
2001a).
The larger proportion of environmental performance data for the paper
sector was collected within the MEPI project according to a de￿ned data
collection protocol. However, further data was collected to expand the data
set in terms of the number of ￿rms and the amount of data available on
individual ￿rms after the data collection process within the MEPI project
was ￿nished. This additional data collection also followed the data collection
protocol used in MEPI (see Berkhout et al., 2001b, for details). Therefore,
all data used in this study was collected following one uni￿ed and de￿ned
approach, based on the data collection protocol developed for the MEPI
project. Prior to discussing in detail the structure and contents of the data
collection protocol, the following section reports in more detail on the data
s o u r c e sa n dd a t ac o l l e c t i o ns t r a t e g i e su s e di nd i ﬀerent countries.
203.2 Data sources and data collection strategies in diﬀerent
countries
D a t ac o l l e c t i o na i m e dt og a t h e ri n f o r m a t i o no nac o r es e to fv a r i a b l e sw h i c h
allows the construction of technically sound and useful environmental per-
formance indicators for the paper manufacturing industry. The initial set
of variables included ￿ve categories of data: resource input (e.g. water con-
sumption), emissions (e.g. sulphur emissions), environmental management
information (e.g. whether or not a ￿rm has a certi￿ed EMS), production
output (e.g. paper production) and business data (e.g. number of employ-
ees). A full list of the initial variables for which data was sought can be
found in Berkhout et al. (2001b). Despite serious eﬀorts, it was not possible
to collect suﬃcient environmental data on all the initial variables, given the
variability found with regard to the data categories. For example, emissions
data is found in most sources, whereas resource inputs are not covered by
the pollution inventories in the UK and the Netherlands, but are included
in most corporate environmental reports and EMAS statements.
Given that data availability and data sources varied between countries,
speci￿c national approaches had to be developed (for details see Berkhout et
al., 2001b, Appendix 3). In Germany data collection focused on environmen-
tal statements published under the EMAS regulations. It was attempted to
gather data from all EMAS registered ￿rms (as of 1998) in the paper man-
ufacturing sector. With few exceptions, data has been collected from the
EMAS statements and has been included in the MEPI data base. Because
the collection and input of the EMAS registered companies￿ data involved
am a j o re ﬀort, no other data sources (other CERs, surveys, databases etc.)
were used.
In Italy, due to the lack of public environmental information, data was
mainly collected through direct contact with ￿rms since corporate environ-
mental reporting was (in 1998/1999) less common than in other European
countries. Even where reports existed they did often not disclose quantita-
tive information consistent with the MEPI data collection protocol require-
ments. Also, in the paper manufacturing sector, neither public authorities,
nor trade associations held databases on corporate environmental data or,
21did not disclose data to stakeholders.
The Dutch emissions register ER-I was the main data source for data
collection in the Netherlands. However, the ER-I data only refers to air
and water emissions. Additional data was therefore collected from negoti-
ated agreements between business and government on environmental policies
(so-called covenants). For data collection on energy consumption, physical
production output and other information, mainly corporate reports and case
studies were used as sources. Data for the paper manufacturing industry is
nearly complete.
Generally, main data sources for the UK were corporate environmental
reports, questionnaires and the public Pollution Inventory (former Chemical
Release Inventory). In addition to that, two private consultancy companies
provided additional data. Data in the paper manufacturing sector, however,
was mainly collected from corporate environmental reports of sites and their
parent ￿rms, and in direct contact of MEPI researchers with ￿rms￿ environ-
mental managers.
Even though the sources of the collected data are diverse, it needs to be
kept in mind that the data collection strategy in the MEPI project aimed
to gather as much information as possible from public sources, whilst simul-
taneously ￿lling crucial data gaps by direct contact with ￿rms (Berkhout et
al., 2001a).
Subsequent to data gathering, the environmental data collected was
matched with ￿nancial data and data on economic performance. Financial
data and data on economic performance was collected from the Amadeus
database maintained by Bureau van Dijk. Matching of records in the two
databases was carried out based on the name and address of ￿rms/sites,
as well as the number of employees for each year (as far as employee ￿g-
ures were available for both, environmental and ￿nancial data). Given that
not for all ￿rms, environmental and economic/￿nancial data were available
simultaneously, the initial number of ￿rms for which environmental perfor-
mance data was collected was reduced to the number of ￿r m sa sd e s c r i b e d
in Table 2 above.
223.3 Data comparability and data quality
From the outset, gathering corporate environmental data was seen as the
main challenge of data collection in the MEPI project. It emerged, however,
that even once data have been collected, ensuring data comparability and
data quality were equally diﬃcult since this required that data are expressed
in the same units of measurement. Frequently, however, data was far from
being standardized. Coal input to production, e.g., was reported in tonnes,
Gigajoules, Gigawatt hours and tonnes of oil equivalent and waste was mea-
sured in tonnes, cubic metres and litres. In order to facilitate the conversion
of measurement units and to minimise errors, a data conversion template
was therefore developed in the MEPI project. This template facilitated au-
tomatic conversion between currencies, as well as weight, length and energy
measurement units (for details see Berkhout et al., 2001b, Appendix 3). It
also converted coal, gas and oil inputs from weight to energy units, using
standard conversion factors for each country.12
A second problem encountered was that environmental and ￿nancial data
did not always refer to the same period. Most environmental data refers to
the calendar year. However, most business and ￿nancial data and a large
part of environmental data stemming from corporate environmental reports
refer to ￿nancial years (in the UK the ￿nancial year is April to March,
whereas e.g. in Germany it is January to December). In the context of this
paper, it was not possible to correct this mismatch. Data (on environmental,
as well as economic performance) was attributed to the calendar year it best
m a t c h e d( e . g . ,i ft h e￿nancial year was April 1995 to March 1996, then the
data was recorded as 1995 data). This seemed acceptable, since a three-
month shift of ￿nancial against calendar year was the maximum mismatch.
The majority of environmental data in the MEPI database has not been
object of rigorous veri￿cation procedures. Only EMAS data is systematically
and formally veri￿ed. However, there are no such requirements for volun-
tary corporate reporting and even the quality of pollution inventories varies,
for example, the UK Pollution Inventory has long been criticised for having
12Factors were extracted from Houghton et al. (1995), as cited in IPCC Greenhouse
Gas Inventory Reference Manual.
23insuﬃcient quality checks. Environmental data gathered through question-
naires is entirely unveri￿ed. However, since the large majority of data in the
paper manufacturing sector was collected from environmental reports pre-
p a r e di nt h ec o n t e x to fv e r i ￿ed environmental management systems (either
based on EMAS or ISO 14001) data quality can generally be expected to
be good. The former is the case in the UK and Germany, where corporate
environmental reports and EMAS statements were the main data sources.
For example, one German ￿rm with several sites/business units in the data
set stated that their data is based on site data from validated environmen-
tal statements under EMAS where validation included an assessment of the
quality and reliability of quantitative data through external environmental
auditors. The same applies generally for the UK where data mainly stems
from validated corporate environmental reports. Only in exceptional cases,
members of ￿rms￿ environmental department were contacted for additional
data not available in the reports.
For the Netherlands, data has been taken mainly from the Dutch na-
tional emissions register ER-I and negotiated agreements between the paper
industry and the Dutch government. Generally this data is considered to be
highly reliable (Berkhout et al., 2001b). The only exception in respect to
data quality is Italy, where data was usually directly supplied by company
representatives, and thus can only be audited indirectly with regard to qual-
ity. As stated at the beginning of this section, in order to address the above
and other related problems of data comparability and data quality, a data
collection protocol was de￿ned for the MEPI project. This protocol, which
was the basis for all data collection activities within the MEPI project, as
well as for the collection of additional environmental performance data in
the pulp and paper manufacturing industry. No data quality issues exist
with regard to the ￿nancial and economic performance data collected. The
next sub-section describes in detail the environmental and ￿nancial variables
used in the empirical analysis.
243.4 Description of individual variables
The variables used to operationalise the concept of environmental perfor-
mance are SO2 emissions, NOx emissions, COD emissions, total energy in-
put, and water input, all per tonne of paper produced. Olsthoorn et al.
(2001) support the use of these indicators in the paper sector. Not for all
variables used to operationalise environmental performance, data was suﬃ-
ciently available to achieve meaningful regression results. Therefore, total
energy input and total water input were subsequently excluded from the
regressions. Theoretically, the use of value added instead of physical pro-
duction output (i.e. tonnes of paper produced) as denominator is better
justi￿ed, since in the case of value added the system boundaries match more
precisely those of the emissions. Physical production output was used never-
theless, since the price of paper on the world markets dropped signi￿cantly
between 1995 and 1996. It was assumed that this would in￿uence more
strongly value added than physical production output. In order to avoid
distortions because of this, the latter was used as denominator.
In addition to the three individual environmental performance indicators
(all normalised/standardized for production output), an index of these was
also calculated, using the method initially developed by Jaggi and Freedman
(1992) in the adaption used by Tyteca et al. (2001). The indicators used
to calculate the index score were SO2,N O x and COD. Description on these
indicators is given in Table 3.13 The higher the value of this index is, the
higher environmental performance is presented.
Table 3 about here
In order to calculate the environmental index variable (hereafter referred
to as INDEX), data on a set of analogous units focused on a speci￿ct y p eo f
production (e.g., ￿rms in the paper manufacturing sector), and characterised
by a variables re￿ecting inputs, desirable outputs, and undesirable outputs
(emissions) needs to be available (Tyteca, 1999, and Berkhout et al., 2001).
13To calculate this index, all pollutant emissions need to be measured in the same
measuring unit (kilo tonnes per tonne). However, in estimations the measuring units of
SO2 and COD are rescaled to tonnes per tonne.
25The principle for calculating INDEX is to make reference to the units
that perform best among the given set, i.e., those that, in the context of this
paper, release the least of emissions, for given levels of output production
(i.e. have the lowest speci￿c emissions per unit of production output, i.e.
per tonne of paper). It is in the following assumed that INDEX will be
calculated for k diﬀerent individual environmental performance indicators
(i.e. the emissions SO2,N O x and COD) ￿ k thus designates the total number
of individual variables/indicators taken into consideration to evaluate the
performance.
Let therefore the emission of the pollutant k, k =1 ,...,K, for the pro-
duction unit (in our case a speci￿c ￿rm) i be denoted as:14
Vk,i =
Absolute emissions for pollutant k of ￿rm i
Unit of production output
. (1)
This variable can be calculated for each of n the ￿rms considered. Based
on this, in the next step, the minimum value for this variable is identi￿ed,
over the whole set of ￿rms:
Vk,min =m i n
i
{Vk,i | i =1 ,...,n}. (2)






The value taken by this ratio will be 1 only for the unit(s) performing
best for the variable considered; for all other units, it will be strictly less
than 1, but larger than 0. It can be interpreted as the contribution (hence
t h ev a r i a b l en a m eCk)o fv a r i a b l eVk,i to INDEX (or global performance
indicator) for ￿rm i. When calculating (3), a problem arises, if the minimum
emission in the data is equal to zero, since then the ratio calculated in (3)
will be equal to zero for all cases in the data set. In such a case, we followed
Berkhout et al. (2001a, p. 141) in using as minimum value an arbitrary,
strictly positive, value which was smaller than the smallest emission value
diﬀerent from zero in the data. At the same time, those cases with zero
emissions on the variable in question were assigned the value of 1.
14In the case of the research reported here, data on speci￿c emissions was readily avail-
able and did not need to be calculated separately.
26Prior to calculating the variable INDEXi for each ￿rm, however, it is
necessary to adjust the contribution Ck for inhomogeneities in the individual
variables. Otherwise, some variables may be given a much higher weight
than others. The reason for this is that the contribution Ck calculated for
one variable may be sometimes on average several orders of magnitude higher
or lower than that for another variable (Berkhout et al., 2001a,b). In such
a case, when summing up the contributions into INDEX, only the variables
with the highest average order of magnitude will in￿uence the value of the
latter. In order to adjust for this (essentially diﬀerences in the skewedness of






F o rt h ec a l c u l a t i o no ft h ei n d e x ,t h eCk,i for each ￿rm i is then multiplied
with corresponding Adk. Finally, the variable INDEXi is calculated for each
￿rm, according to the following formula (5). As can be seen from (5), when
summing up the adjusted contributions of each individual environmental
performance variable, these will be implicitly assigned an arbitrary weight
of one. In the formula, the sum of the adjusted contributions is divided by
the number of variables, resulting in an index which takes values smaller or











Tyteca et al. (2001) emphasize that with this index calculated according
to the method suggested by Jaggi and Freedman￿s (1992), the variables are
treated independently of each other, rather than being all considered simul-
taneously in a multi-dimensional space. Since the likelihood of a speci￿c
￿rm being the best on all individual indicators/variables is very small, IN-
DEX therefore usually takes values strictly less than one. In the estimations,
log(INDEX) was used to achieve less skewed distribution. Indeed, Figure 4
shows the kernel density estimate of INDEX with high frequencies for ex-
treme values whereas Figure 5 displays a less heterogenous distribution of
log(INDEX).15
15Gaussian kernel with optimal bandwidth criterion were used to estimate the density
27Figures 4 and 5 about here
The variables used to operationalise the concept of economic perfor-
mance are return on equity (ROE), return on capital employed (ROCE)
a n dr e t u r no ns a l e s( R O S ) .T h e ya r eb r i e ￿y described in the following.
Return on equity (ROE, also called return on shareholders￿ funds) is
de￿ned as the ratio of pro￿t before taxation (but after interest and pref-
erence dividends) to ordinary shareholders￿ funds (Pendlebury and Groves,
1999). Ordinary shareholders￿ funds consist of average ordinary share capi-
tal, reserves and retained pro￿t for the period. Return on equity shows the
pro￿tability of the company in terms of the capital provided by ordinary
shareholders (which are the owners of the company). It thus focuses on the
eﬃciency of the ￿rm in earning pro￿ts on behalf of its ordinary shareholders,
by relating pro￿ts to the total amount of shareholders￿ funds employed by
the ￿rm. In doing this, return on equity is the most comprehensive measure
of the performance of a company and its management for a period since it
takes into account all aspects of trading and ￿nancing, from the viewpoint
of the ordinary shareholder (Pendlebury and Groves, 1999, and Reid and
Myddelton, 1995). As a consequence of this, ROE can be aﬀected by a
￿rm￿s capital structure (i.e. its gearing), which is not the case with the next
ratio discussed.
The rate of return on capital employed (ROCE) measures the pro￿tabil-
ity of the capital employed. It is de￿ned as the ratio between gross trading
pro￿t (net of depreciation) and the capital employed (Morris and Hay, 1991).
However, this is only one possible de￿nition, since no general agreement ex-
ists on how capital employed should be calculated, or on how pro￿ts h o u l d
be de￿ned (Lumby, 1991). More recent de￿nitions fairly consistently de￿ne
ROCE as the ratio between earnings before interest, taxation and excep-
tional items (EBIT) to the (average) net assets (i.e. total assets less current
liabilities) for the period (Pendlebury and Groves, 1999, and Reid and My-
ddelton, 1995). This is also the de￿nition adopted in this paper. Generally,
ROCE measures the eﬃciency, with which capital is employed in producing
(Silverman, 1986). Note again that log(INDEX) is always negative. Positive values of
log(INDEX) displayed on the abscissa are purely due to graphical rescaling.
28income. It indicates the performance achieved regardless of the method of
￿nancing (i.e. the ￿rm￿s capital structure), since it uses total capital em-
ployed (i.e. net total assets) before ￿nancing charges (i.e. interest), rather
than only the part of total capital that relates to shareholders￿ interests
(Pendlebury and Groves, 1999, and Reid and Myddelton, 1995).
Return on sales (ROS) can be based on net pro￿t before interest and
gross pro￿t. The ￿rst yields the net pro￿t percentage (also called net pro￿t
margin). It is de￿ned as the net pro￿t before interest and tax divided by
sales revenue and measures the percentage of sales revenue generated as
pro￿t for all providers of long-term capital after deduction of cost of goods
sold and other operating costs. For the purpose of this research, return
o ns a l e si sd e ￿ned as the ratio of pro￿t (loss) before tax to total sales (i.e.
operating revenue), in accordance with the literature (Reid and Myddelton,
1995). This ratio indicates to what degree a ￿rm was successful in achieving
the maximum sales possible whilst simultaneously keeping costs minimal
(Pendlebury and Groves, 1999).
Next to the dependent variables described above used to measure the
concepts of environmental and economic performance respectively, country
dummy variables for the four countries in which data was collected for pa-
per manufacturing ￿rms, as well as a variable measuring the size of ￿rms
(in thousands of employees) were included as independent variables in the
regressions. In addition to that, a number of control variables were included
in the regressions with economic performance as dependent variable. These
are brie￿y described in the following.
The asset-turnover ratio (i.e. the ratio of total assets to operating rev-
enue) can be considered to measure the capital intensity of a ￿rm￿s oper-
ations. Russo and Fouts (1997) suggest to include this ratio as a control
variable when carrying out regressions with ROA (return on assets), ROCE,
ROE and ROS as dependent variable. A low ratio would indicate a ￿rm with
below-average capital intensity which Schaltegger and Figge (1998) argue
can also be considered bene￿cial in terms of value-oriented environmental
management.
The solvency ratio addresses a ￿rm￿s longer-term solvency (and thus its
capital structure) and is concerned with its ability to meet its longer-term
29￿nancial commitments (Arnold et al., 1985).16 De￿ned as the ratio between
shareholder funds and total assets, it is a measure for capital structure and
investment/￿nancial risk (Pendlebury and Groves 1999, pp. 262￿263). This
means that the inverse of the solvency ratio is a possible measure for ￿nancial
leverage which Hart and Ahuja (1996) suggest to control for when assessing
in￿uences on economic performance. Therefore, we include the inverse of the
solvency ratio (after deducting one) as a control variable in the regressions
with ROE, ROS and ROCE as dependent variables. This is because the
inverse of the solvency ratio minus one equals the gearing ratio which is
usually used to control for ￿nancial leverage.
Value added per employee is an eﬃciency/eﬀectiveness ratio and mea-
sures the labour productivity of a ￿rm (Pendlebury and Groves, 1999). Value
added here is de￿ned as the sum of taxation, pro￿t/loss for the period, cost
of employees, depreciation and interest paid. Value added per employee
was found to correlate highly with the asset-turnover ratio. To avoid multi-
collinearity it was therefore not used as control variable in the regressions.
The current ratio (i.e. the ratio between current assets and current liabil-
ities, also called working capital ratio), as one of the liquidity/stability ratios,
measures the resources available to meet short-term creditors (Pendlebury
and Groves 1999, p. 201, and Myers and Brealey, 1988). This is of interest,
because a weak liquidity position in the present implies increased challenges
for a company to achieve its long-term objectives, including the generation
of future cash ￿ows. The current ratio, by computing the ratio between
current assets and liabilities indicates a company￿s ability to meet its short-
term cash obligations out of its current assets without having to raise ￿nance
through borrowing, issuing more share or the sale of ￿xed assets.17 Accept-
able values for the current ratio range between 0.5:1 to 2.5:1 (Arnold et al.,
1985). A higher current ratio is consistent with a lower asset-turnover ratio
(as a measure of capital intensity), i.e. ￿rms with a lower asset-turnover
16Longer-term solvency is related to the composition of a ￿rm￿s capital structure. The
higher the proportion of a ￿rm￿s ￿nance that consists of loan capital, the higher are its
interest payments. The increased risk of the ￿rm failing to meet these aﬀects in turn
estimates of its future performance (Arnold et al., 1985).
17Raising additional ￿nance in either one of these ways can adversely aﬀect a company￿s
ability to generate future net cash ￿ows.
30ratio have proportionally less ￿xed assets and correspondingly more current
assets and vice versa. This means, however, that multi-collinearity between
the current ratio and the asset-turnover ratio exists, and because of this, the
current ratio was not included as a control variable in the analysis.
The four hypotheses formulated above were tested for the described data
set of paper manufacturing ￿rms using a pooled regression, a panel regres-
sion framework with random ￿rm and temporal eﬀects and a simultaneous
equations system. It has to be noted that for the economic, as well as envi-
ronmental performance variables, data is usually not available for all ￿rms
in the data set. Therefore, the set of ￿rms diﬀers slightly from one regression
to another.
Descriptive statistics and a summary of the de￿nition of variables are
given in Appendix 1. For the economic performance variables, we ￿nd the
mean for ROCE decreasing from 1995 to 1997, whereas the means for ROE
and ROS are oscillating. Consistently with this, the minima and maxima
for ROCE are changing most, year-on-year. Nevertheless, descriptive statis-
tics for the economic performance variables vary much less over time than
do those for environmental performance variables. Here, we ￿nd that the
mean for COD increases from 1995 to 1997 a factor of 5. The mean of
SO2 oscillates in a similar way as found for economic performance, however
t h em e a no fN O x increases from 1996 to 1997 by more than one order of
magnitude. This is mainly due to a very high maximum value for NOx
in 1997. Mean, standard deviation, maximum and minimum of the aggre-
gated variable INDEX (derived as described in the previous section) varies
little across the three years. Of the control variables, ￿rm size varies little
across the years, whereas the inverse of the solvency ratio minus one (SR_1)
and the asset-turnover ratio vary more in their descriptive statistics across
1995 to 1997. The dummy variables for country membership and sub-sector
membership only vary very little across years, as would be expected of these
r a t h e rs t r u c t u r a lf a c t o r s .F o rb o t h ,t h ee c o n o m i c ,a sw e l la se n v i r o n m e n t a l
performance variables, data was usually not available for all ￿rms in the
data set. Therefore, the set of ￿rms diﬀers slightly from one regression to
another.
314E c o n o m e t r i c s p e c i ￿cations
Our analysis of the empirical relationship of the determinants of environ-
mental and economic performance of ￿r m si n v o l v e sa ne s t i m a t i o np r o c e d u r e
b a s e do np a n e ld a t am o d e l sa n ds i m u l t a n e o u se q u a t i o n ss y s t e m .I na￿rst
stage, we consider separately environmental performance and economic per-
formance, that is, the indicators of environmental performance or those re-
lated to economic performance of ￿rms are used as response (endogenous)
variables. In a second stage we account for the endogeneity between these
two concepts and estimate the structural relationships describing the varia-
tion of endogenous variables.
4.1 Separated equations
We consider a three-error-components panel data model. The speci￿cation
has the following structure (Baltagi, 1995):
yit = α + xitβ + ziγ + uit, (6)
and
uit = ￿i + λt + εit,i =1 ,•••,N;t =1 ,•••,T. (7)
In the above speci￿cation, yit denotes observation on the dependent vari-
able for a ￿rm i at period t, that is either the environmental performance of a
given ￿rm or its economic performance, xit represents the set of time-variant
regressors and zi the time-invariant explanatory variables; uit is composed
of: (i) a disturbance ￿i (￿rm eﬀect) that re￿ects left-out variables which are
time-persistent in the sense that for each ￿rm i, they remain roughly the
same over time and capture unobservable ￿rm heterogeneity; (ii) a period-
speci￿cc o m p o n e n tλt (year eﬀect), traducing omitted variables which aﬀect
all individuals in period t,a n d￿nally, (iii) the idiosyncratic error εit.W e
assume that ￿i, λt and εit are mutually independent and independent of the




On the assumption that u ≡[u11,u 12,...,uNT]
0 ∼ N(0,Ω),t h es p e c i ￿ca-
tion above is known to be a random eﬀects model and can be estimated by
maximum likelihood procedure proposed by Amemiya (1971). Such a joint
32likelihood function of observations yit conditional on the values of the inde-
pendent variables xit and zi is relatively complex. It requires spectral de-
compositions of the covariance as well as the concentration of the likelihood
function with respect to some parameters and Generalized Least Squares
(GLS) implementation. So, we report the various steps of the estimation
procedure in Appendix 2.
4.2 Simultaneous equations
In the above speci￿cation, we consider estimating separately parameters
aﬀecting environmental performance and economic performance of ￿rms. As
discussed in Section 2, as far as the channel relationships are concerned, the
empirical analysis of mutual in￿uences between environmental performance
and economic performance can be entirely speci￿ed through the estimation
of a structural relationship in a simultaneous equations system.
Our model contains G theoretical relationships (g =1 ,...,G)f o re n d o -
geneity and K exogenous variables. Contrary to the separated estimations,
the data is pooled to consist in NT observations. That is to say, we do not
use the panel structure of the sample. The two reasons motivating such a
consideration are: on the one hand, due to small data set, if we have to
account for the panel structure, we might estimate much more parameters
and, on the other hand, as shown in Figures 4 and 5 above, the distribu-
tion of variable log(INDEX) is less heterogeneous than the distribution of
INDEX.
The full system of equations is

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. The structure of Σ allows for correlation
between the disturbances of these equations. The elements of the NT ￿
(Mg + Kg) matrix Wg represent both the Mg endogenous variables and Kg
33exogenous variables included in the right-hand side of the equations. The
system can be estimated by tree-stage least squares as described in Greene
(2000).
An important issue following from the estimation of simultaneous equa-
tions systems is the restrictions that can be placed on the structural form
in order to identify parameters. Such restrictions are known to be the so-
called ￿order condition￿. We set the discussion about the identi￿cation of
our system in the next section, when presenting estimation results.
5 Estimation results
In this section, we use all the materials sketched above to evaluate empiri-
cally the determinants of the relationship between the economic performance
and the environmental performance at ￿rm level.18 In addition to the vari-
ables presented in Table A1, we add the square of some of them in order to
account for non-linearities. This is the case for ￿rm size, economic perfor-
mance indicators and environmental performance indicators. In the sequel,
we present ￿rstly the results for the separated regressions and then, we
present estimates based on simultaneous equations system.
5.1 Separated equations
The results for pooled model and three-error-components model for eco-
nomic performance indicators (ROCE, ROE and ROS) are reported in Ta-
bles 4 and 5, respectively. Results attached the same speci￿cations for
pollutant emissions (NOx,S O 2 a n dC O D )a r ep r e s e n t e di nT a b l e s6a n d7 ,
respectively. Estimation results for the environmental index are presented
in Table 8.
Tables 4 and 5 about here
Tables 6-8 about here
For the three-error components models, we also present a Breusch and
Pagan￿s (1980) test for the existence of random eﬀects. This gives a Lagrange-
18Estimation procedures in GAUSS and STATA are available from the authors upon
request.
34multiplier statistic which has a χ2 distribution. Three test statistics are com-
puted corresponding to the following three null hypotheses: H1
0 : σ2
￿ =0
(non existence of random ￿rm eﬀect, χ2
(1)),H 2
0 : σ2
λ =0(non existence of




λ =0(non existence of both
random ￿rm and random year eﬀects, χ2
(2)). The last test statistic is the
sum of the ￿rst two. As reported in Tables 5, 7 and 8, we ￿nd that the
random ￿rm eﬀect and then the joint random ￿r ma n dr a n d o my e a re ﬀects
speci￿cations cannot be rejected in most cases (null hypotheses rejected at
5% or 10% level). However, there is no evidence of a random year eﬀect
model in all cases.
Concerning economic performance of ￿rms, results indicate that the lin-
ear term of ￿rm size has a signi￿cant and positive eﬀect on ROE only for
the pooled regression. Firm size has no signi￿cant eﬀect on the other eco-
nomic performance variables in both econometric speci￿cations (pooled and
random eﬀects). Both, the inverse of the solvency ratio minus one (SR_1),
as well as the asset-turnover ratio (i.e. the inverse of the turnover-to-asset
ratio) have a signi￿cant eﬀect on ROCE (10% level) and on ROS (5% level)
in the pooled model. In the random eﬀects model, SR_1 has a signi￿cant
eﬀect at the 5% level on ROS and ROE, but not on ROCE, whereas the
asset-turnover ratio is signi￿cant only for ROCE at the 10% level. The in-
verse of the solvency minus one and the asset-turnover ratio have opposite
signs for ROCE and ROS in both models. In other words, the inverse of the
solvency ratio minus one (the asset-turnover ratio) is positive (negative) for
ROCE, but negative (positive) for ROS, whereas they are always negative
for ROE. The non-signi￿cance of SR_1 (as a proxy measure for leverage)
i nt h ec a s eo fR O C Ef o rt h er a n d o me ﬀects model is more in-line with the-
oretical reasoning, than the result of the pooled model, since theoretically
ROCE in the way it is calculated is already controlled for capital structure.
Concerning sub-sector dummy variables (with the cultural sub-sector
being used as the reference group), no signi￿cant eﬀect was found, neither
in the pooled model, nor in the random eﬀects model. Regarding country
dummy variables (with Germany being used as the reference group), the
United Kingdom, Italy and the Netherlands were found to be signi￿cant and
positive in the pooled regressions for some economic performance variables.
35However, for Italy and the Netherlands, as well as for the United Kingdom
in the case of ROS and ROE, the signi￿cant eﬀects in the pooled model
become insigni￿cant in the random eﬀects model. Only the positive eﬀect
of the United Kingdom (compared to Germany) dummy on ROCE remains
signi￿cant at the 5% level, whichever econometric speci￿cation is applied.
Concerning environmental performance of ￿rms, ￿rm size is found to
have no signi￿cant eﬀect on any individual environmental performance vari-
able (NOx,S O 2 and COD) as well as the environmental index based on
these individual variables, regardless of the econometric speci￿cation. SO2
emissions were found to be negatively and signi￿cantly sensitive to ￿rm
membership in the mixed sub-sector, -6.824 at the 10% level in the pooled
regression and -6.912 at the 5% level in the random eﬀects model. Also, a
positive and signi￿cant mixed and industrial sub-sector in￿uence was found
for COD emissions (in both econometric speci￿cations) as well as a neg-
ative and signi￿cant in￿uence on the environmental index (for the pooled
regression model only).
Regarding country dummy variables (Gemany being considered as the
reference country), country location of ￿rms in the Netherlands was found
to have a positive and signi￿cant in￿uence on SO2 and COD emissions.
Country location of ￿rms in the United Kingdom and Italy was found to
have a signi￿cant positive (the United Kingdom) and negative (Italy) eﬀect,
respectively, on COD emissions. The in￿uence is signi￿cant at the 10% and
5% level for the random eﬀects and pooled regression model, respectively.
For the environmental index, the United Kingdom and Italy were also found
to have a negative (the United Kingdom) and positive (Italy) in￿uence which
is signi￿cant at the 5% level.
5.2 Simultaneous equations
Earlier, we have pointed out that identi￿cation issue is crucial when estimat-
ing simultaneous equations system. Before presenting the results, we now
discuss this question. In order to achieve identi￿cation of each equation in
the simultaneous system we have to look for the order condition which re-
quires that the number of exogenous variables excluded from this equation
36must be at least as large as the number of endogenous variables included
(see, e.g., Greene, 2000, Chapter 16).
Using the same notations as in Section 4, our system consist in G =2
equations, the ￿rst one is for economic performance indicators (ROCE, ROS
or ROE) and the second one is for the environmental index (the log of IN-
D E X ) .T h e nw eh a v et oe s t i m a t ethree independent systems in total. In
each system, we have four endogenous variables: two linear terms and their
squares. The exogenous variables in each system are: ￿rm size, the inverse
of the solvency ratio minus one (SR_1), the asset-turnover ratio, country
dummies, and sub-sector dummies. To meet the identi￿cation order condi-
tion we have to exclude some exogenous variables from each equation of the
system. As in the separated regressions, we exclude SR_1 and the asset-
turnover ratio from the environmental equation. Moreover, we decided to
exclude the sub-sector dummies from the environmental equation while the
country dummies are excluded from the economic equation. We also include
from the environmental (economic) equation the linear and the square term
of economic performance indicator (environmental index). Therefore, for
the economic equation, there are two included endogenous variables against
three excluded exogenous variables. For the environmental equation, there
are two included endogenous variables against ￿ve excluded exogenous vari-
ables. Hence, the above identi￿cation condition is met.
The inclusion and the exclusion of country and sub-sector dummies in the
system are motivated by preliminary estimations based on a system where
sub-sector dummies are used as regressors in the environmental equation
and where country dummies are excluded. In these preliminary estimations,
we included country dummies in the economic equation (with sub-sector
dummies being excluded). Other variables are used as described before.
As above, there are also three independent systems to be estimated. This
preliminary estimations provided us with no signi￿cant eﬀects at 5% level
for almost all parameters in all systems, excepted for the industrial sub-
sector dummy in the environmental equation for the system given by ROS
and log(INDEX).
We use the environmental index in each system in place of environmental
performance indicators (NOx,S O 2, and COD) separately. Indeed, this in-
37dex seems to be a better global measure of environmental performance than
each environmental indicator taken separately. Another important justi￿-
cation of the use of this index is that if we used separately NOx,S O 2,a n d
COD in the equations systems, we can only estimate a partial relationship
between economic performance and environmental performance. For exam-
ple, the system given by COD and ROCE does not take into account the
interaction between NOx,S O 2 and ROCE. However, these indicators could
interact simultaneously with economic performance. Therefore, we propose
to model such interaction in a simultaneous equations system for economic
performance and the environmental index. The estimation results for the
retained equation system are reported in Tables 9￿11.
Tables 9￿11 about here
Let us consider ￿rstly the economic equations (ROCE, ROE, and ROS).
We observe that the environmental index (both its linear and square terms)
has a positive and signi￿cant (at 10% and 5% level, respectively) eﬀect
on ROCE but has no eﬀect on the other economic performance indica-
tors. In Figure 6, we plot the estimated relationship between ROCE and
log(INDEX). The graph displays a U-shape curve. However, the increas-
ing part of the curve is not robust due to few observations. Then only the
decreasing part might be considered. This decreasing part shows a relation
with a negative ￿rst derivative and a positive second derivative. This ￿nding
seems more consistent with ￿traditionalist￿ reasoning about the relationship
between environmental and economic performance, which predicts the re-
lationship to be uniformly negative (see Section 2, Figure 1). This result
shows evidence of a trade-oﬀ between return on capital employed and envi-
ronmental performance. Implications of this result will be discussed later.
Figure 6 about here
Firm size has no signi￿cant in￿uence on our three economic performance
variables. SR_1 in the ROCE equation is positive and signi￿cant at 5%
level. This is however inconsistent with theory, since ROCE is theoretically
already controlled for gearing. It is insigni￿cant in other economic equations.
38For the asset-turnover ratio, we obtain a negative and signi￿cant impact at
10% level on ROCE, and a positive and signi￿cant impact at 5% level on
ROS while no relationship is found for ROE.
Concerning sub-sector dummies in the economic equations (remember
that country dummies are excluded from this equation for identi￿cation
purpose), industrial and mixed sub-sector have a signi￿cant eﬀe c ta t1 0 %
and 5%, respectively, on ROS. This eﬀect is negative. Then ￿rms in these
two sub-sectors have less return on sales than ￿rms in the cultural sub-
sectors (reference), all other things being equal.
Now we discuss the results following from the environmental equation.
There is no evidence of signi￿cant relationship between economic perfor-
m a n c ev a r i a b l ea n dt h el o go ft h ee n v i r o n m e n t a li n d e x . T h es a m ec o n -
clusion applies to ￿rm size. About country dummies (sub-sector dummies
are excluded from the environmental equation), United Kingdom located
￿r m sh a v en e g a t i v ea n ds i g n i ￿cant eﬀect on log(INDEX) in the system with
ROCE (10% level) and in the system with ROS (5% level). Italy located
￿rms in￿uence positively and signi￿cantly at 5% level log(INDEX) in the
system with ROS. As a result, from an environmental point of view, we
can conclude that United Kingdom and Italy located ￿rms perform respec-
tively less and more than Germany ones. This may indicate a selection bias
towards better-performing ￿rms in Italy (likely as a result of self-selection).
In Tables 9￿11, we also report the F-statistics to test the signi￿cancy
of each equation in each system. The environmental equation is signi￿cant
at 5% level in all systems, excepted for the system de￿ned by ROCE and
log(INDEX) which is signi￿cant at 10% level. The economic equation is
signi￿cant only for ROS.
6 Conclusions and Recommendations
As noticed in Section 3, the data sample covers a low proportion of Italian
￿rms. We also know that the environmental regulation is less stringent in
Italy than in other countries (notably Germany). So the better environ-
mental performance of Italian ￿rms (in both separated and simultaneous
regressions) is an unexpected result and we think that it should be treated
39carefully.
T h eh y p o t h e s i sH 1s e e m st ob ec o n ￿rmed, since, relative to Germany,
other country dummies have a positive and signi￿cant eﬀect on economic
performance in the pooled regressions. This can be interpreted in a way
that a strong country eﬀect for economic performance exists, which can
be interpreted as higher costs of environmental regulation since economic
performance is relatively lower in Germany than in the other three countries.
However, it has to be noted that most country eﬀects become insigni￿cant
in the random eﬀects model (except for the UK), thus indicating that any
reduction of competitiveness through stringent environmental regulation has
to be considered carefully with regard to other (random) in￿uences on the
economic performance of ￿rms.
With regard to environmental performance, H1 seems to be con￿rmed
in that there are some signi￿cant positive country eﬀects for COD, SO2
and the environmental index (i.e. signi￿cant and positive coeﬃcients for
the Netherlands and the United Kingdom). This can be interpreted as
a better environmental performance of ￿rms in Germany, relative to the
other countries. Consistent with this is also the reversal of the coeﬃcient
signs in the case of the environmental index for the UK(since for the index,
high values represent good performance, whereas the inverse is the case for
the individual environmental performance variables). However, the country
in￿uences found for Italy for the index and for COD are inconsistent with
H1. Therefore, (i) the in￿uence of stringent environmental regulation on
the environmental performance of ￿r m ss e e m st ob es e n s i t i v et ot h es p e c i ￿c
measure for environmental performance and (ii) in the case of Italy, the
selection of ￿rms may have been biased towards the better environmental
performers.
T h eH y p o t h e s i sH 2s e e m st ob ec o n ￿rmed only to some degree, since the
analysis found positive and signi￿cant coeﬃcients for the United Kingdom
and the Netherlands in the case of all economic performance variables in the
pooled regression. Given that the Netherlands and the UK are rated high-
est with regard to the use of ￿exible (i.e. economic) instruments in Table 1
this result is as expected. However, it has again to be noted that (i) most
eﬀects become insigni￿cant in the random eﬀects model and that (ii) in the
40pooled regressions also Italy has a signi￿cant country eﬀect on ROE, which is
counter to the ranking in Table 1. Therefore, economic instruments seem to
have a less negative/more positive in￿uence on economic performance, but
again, random eﬀects seem to have some in￿uence. In addition to this, there
is of course some interdependence between hypotheses H1 and H2. In sum-
mary, the relationship between environmental and economic performance as
predicted in H1 and H2 only holds in direct comparisons of Germany and
the UK for ROCE, COD and the environmental index (based on the random
eﬀect model).
Hypothesis H3 is con￿rmed in the case of the environmental performance
variables. The ￿ndings regarding sub-sector in￿uences on environmental
performance variables are consistent with the strong sub-sector eﬀect found
by Berkhout et al. (2001b). However, the fact that some of the sub-sector
in￿uences become insigni￿cant in the random eﬀects model indicates that
do not account for unobservable ￿rm heterogeneity in the pooled regression
might have arti￿cially increased signi￿cance levels for sub-sector in￿uence
in some cases. Regarding the economic performance variables, no signi￿cant
sub-sector eﬀect could be found.
Regarding hypothesis H4 it was found that there is almost no signi￿cant
eﬀect of ￿rm size on either economic or environmental performance, the
only exception being a positive and signi￿cant eﬀect of the linear term for
￿rm size on ROE in the case of pooled regression, which however becomes
insigni￿cant for the random eﬀects model. This con￿rms H4 with regards to
economic performance (where no signi￿cant eﬀect was expected), but also
indicates that there seems to be no substantial diﬀerence in environmental
performance between smaller and larger ￿rms. This means that the often
perceived diﬀerences between SMEs and large ￿rms are likely smaller than
stated in the literature and that (given that the insigni￿cance of ￿rm size on
economic performance was con￿rmed) the a priori assumption that smaller
￿rms tend to have a less positive relationship between environmental and
economic performance has to be considered carefully. At least the data anal-
ysed here does not provide an indication that smaller ￿rms cannot achieve as
easily economies of scale in environmental management as larger ones. Dif-
ferences of cross-sectional variances were only analysed qualitatively based
41on scatterplots for 95-97 averages.19 Scatterplots indicate decreasing vari-
ance with increasing ￿rm size for ROS, ROCE, COD, NOx and SO2.T h i s
might indicate a higher variation in the relationship between environmental
and economic performance for smaller ￿rms.
What the separated regressions did not take into account is the possible
endogeneity of the relationship between environmental and economic perfor-
mance. The mutual in￿uences between environmental and economic perfor-
mance were therefore addressed by means of three simultaneous equations
systems. For these, it was found that the results -for the system with ROCE
as economic performance variable, only- were more consistent with the ￿tra-
ditionalist￿ view, than with the ￿revisionist￿ perspective on the relationship
between environmental and economic performance. However results are not
very clear-cut, in that similar results could not be found for the systems
with ROS and ROE as economic performance variables, respectively.
The important question is of course at this point, what these ￿ndings im-
ply for the relationship between environmental and economic performance.
There seem to be two main conclusions. Firstly, there seems to be consid-
erable in￿uence of noise in the data. Environmental and economic perfor-
mance can be in￿uenced by many more factors than those included in the
theoretical framework. Although it was attempted to keep the in￿uence of
these other factors constant, we have no de￿nite benchmark indicating to
which degree this was achieved. Given that the signal of environmental per-
formance as an in￿uence on economic performance is small, it would be de-
sirable to utilize, in a next research step, more direct measures capturing the
relationship between environmental and economic performance. One way to
achieve this could e.g. be the separation of some ￿green pro￿t￿ component
from the overall economic performance of a ￿rm. Secondly, even though
some of the ￿ndings for the simultaneous equation systems ￿tb e t t e rw i t h
￿traditionalist￿ reasoning about the relationship between environmental and
economic performance, which predicts the relationship to be uniformly neg-
ative, both theoretical models presented in the beginning of the paper are
not well-supported by the results. This element of inconclusiveness in the
19Scatterplots are available from the authors on request.
42results will likely be reduced if a more direct measure of that part of a ￿rm￿s
overall pro￿tability which is the result of its environmental performance (or
improvements thereof) can be devised and applied.
437 Appendix
7.1 Appendix 1: Variable de￿nition and descriptive statis-
tics
Table A1: De￿nition of variables.
Variable Description Typea
Economic ROCE Return on capital employed cont.
performance ROE Return on equity cont.
R O S R e t u r no ns a l e s c o n t .
COD Emissions of chemical oxygen demand cont.
Environmental (tonnes per tonne, t/t)
performance SO2 Emissions of sulphur dioxide (t/t) cont.
NOx Emissions of nitrogen oxides (kilo t/t) cont.
Log(INDEX) Log of the environmental index (dimensionless) cont.
Firm size Number of employees (thousand) int.
Control SR_1 Inverse of solvency ratio minus one (%) cont.
variables Asset-turnover Inverse of the turnover-to-asset ratio
ratio (Great Britain Pounds GBP/GBP) cont.
United Kingdom United Kingdom located ￿rm dum.
Country Italy Italy located ￿rm dum.
Netherlands Netherlands located ￿rm dum.
Germany Germany located ￿rm dum.
Cultural Newsprint, magazine-grade, and dum.
graphics ￿ne paper (reference)
Sub-sector Industrial Packaging corrugated and other boards dum.
Mixed Cultural and industrial paper production dum.
Other Other paper production dum.
a cont., int., and dum. mean respectively continuous type, integer type (treated in
the estimations as continuous) and dummy type variables.
44Table A2: Descriptive statistics for year 1995
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Min Max. #obs.
ROCE 0.155 0.217 -0.1254 1.043 32
ROE 0.1278 0.2088 -0.2713 0.7032 33
ROS 0.0422 0.0664 -0.0711 0.2321 33
COD 7.9413 8.5049 0.2902 27.2964 28
SO2 3.3497 9.559 0 49.1401 28
NOx 0.0020 0.0047 0 0.0256 30
INDEX 0.1449 0.3383 0.0008 0.9886 22
Log(INDEX) -4.3993 2.19 -7.138 -0.0115 22
Firm size 0.6873 0.6907 0.119 3.548 33
SR_1 2.7423 2.1846 0.2174 11.0048 33
Asset-turnover ratio 1.0285 0.919 0.4366 5.6249 33
United Kingdom 0.2571 0.4435 0 1 35
Italy 0.2 0.4058 0 1 35
Netherlands 0.2571 0.4435 0 1 35
Germany 0.2857 0.4583 0 1 35
Industrial 0.1714 0.3824 0 1 35
Cultural 0.4571 0.5054 0 1 35
Mixed 0.2571 0.4434 0 1 35
Other 0.1143 0.3228 0 1 35
45Table A3: Descriptive statistics for year 1996
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Min Max. #obs.
ROCE 0.113 0.1552 -0.3641 0.5582 31
ROE 0.1326 0.2364 -0.514 0.7951 32
ROS 0.0502 0.0807 -0.1264 0.254 32
COD 9.9113 15.7274 0.3301 80.057 28
SO2 3.4133 10.105 0 51.9481 28
NOx 0.002 0.0056 0 0.3070 29
INDEX 0.139 0.3318 0.0007 0.9883 23
Log(INDEX) -4.5607 2.2535 -7.3214 -0.0118 23
Firm size 0.6913 0.7564 0.132 4.019 33
SR_1 2.3952 1.4604 0.3203 5.1162 32
Asset-turnover ratio 1.1476 0.7207 0.4187 3.5352 32
United Kingdom 0.2647 0.4478 0 1 34
Italy 0.2059 0.4104 0 1 34
Netherlands 0.2353 0.4306 0 1 34
Germany 0.2941 0.4625 0 1 34
Industrial 0.1765 0.387 0 1 34
Cultural 0.4412 0.504 0 1 34
Mixed 0.2647 0.4478 0 1 34
Other 0.1176 0.3270 0 1 34
46Table A4: Descriptive statistics for year 1997
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Min Max. #obs.
ROCE 0.0982 0.0872 -0.1146 0.346 29
ROE 0.0776 0.2334 -0.8601 0.5338 32
ROS 0.0213 0.1213 -0.5316 0.1902 33
COD 41.3956 187.1874 0.4293 1082.353 33
SO2 2.4419 8.9888 0 49.6278 31
NOx 1.1192 4.8961 0 26.4546 33
INDEX 0.1189 0.3028 0.0007 0.9879 28
Log(INDEX) -4.4283 2.0578 -7.26 -0.0121 28
Firm size 0.6273 0.6827 0.11 3.697 36
SR_1 2.2948 1.5828 0.2425 5.8823 33
Asset-turnover ratio 1.0452 0.5665 0.3792 2.9673 32
United Kingdom 0.2432 0.435 0 1 37
Italy 0.2432 0.435 0 1 37
Netherlands 0.2432 0.435 0 1 37
Germany 0.2703 0.4502 0 1 37
Industrial 0.1892 0.3971 0 1 37
Cultural 0.4324 0.5022 0 1 37
Mixed 0.2432 0.435 0 1 37
Other 0.1351 0.3466 0 1 37
Appendix 2: Maximum likelihood estimation of the separated
equations
To simplify notation, we denote ﬂ x =[ x,z],a n dﬂ β =[ β0,γ0]0 the proper
stacked format of time-varying as well as time-invariant regressors and re-
lated vector of parameters, where the intercept term is excluded by tacking
deviations from the overall sample mean. Then, on the assumption that





47the joint log likelihood of the observations y, conditional on the values of x













ln[det(ξ1BN + ξ2BT + ξ3W)], (10)




ε, ρ = σ2
￿/σ2, ω = σ2
λ/σ2, ξ3 = σ2
ε/σ2. The matrix notations
are completed as BN =( IN − JN
N ) ⊗ (JN
T ), BT = JN
N ⊗ (IT − JT
T ), W =
(IN − JN
N )⊗(IT − JT
T ), y∗ =( Ω∗)
−1/2y and ﬂ x∗ =( Ω∗)
−1/2ﬂ x, where (Ω∗)
−1/2
is the squared root matrix which yields the proper spectral decomposition
representation of Ω (Wansbeek and Kapteyn, 1982, 1983).
The log likelihood function can be concentrated in terms of the param-
eters ρ and ω by ￿xing these and maximizing out ﬂ β and σ2.T h e G L S












As a result, the concentrated log-likelihood function is a function only in
arguments ρ and ω and can be maximised with respect those parameters by
grid search or steepest ascent methods. For details on this computation, see
Nerlove (1999).
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    (a)      (b)
Figure 1: (a) the ￿traditionalist￿ view; (b) the ￿revisionist￿ view.
Influencing factors:
-  corporate environmental strategies/management
-  country location/ environmental regulation
-  processes operated
-  industry market structure / sector membership
-  firm size
Environmental performance Economic performance
Figure 2: Initial model for the interaction of environmental and economic
performance.
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Figure 4: Kernel density estimate of INDEX for the pooled data. High
















Figure 5: Kernel density estimate of log(INDEX) for the pooled data. Tri-
modal distribution underlying the environmental index. Positive values of











Figure 6: The relationship between ROCE and log(INDEX) obtained from
the estimation of the simultaneous equations system.
59Table 1: Stringency of regulation and orientation towards economic instru-
m e n t si nf o u rc o u n t r i e s
Country Germany Italy Netherlands UK
Stringency of regulation 1.82 0.25 1.53 0.99
(rank, 1 = highest) a (1) (4) (2) (3)
Use of ￿exible instruments
(rank, 1= highest) b (3) (4) (1) (2)
Transparency of regulation 4.1 2.8 4.4 4.5
(rank, 1= highest) c (3) (4) (2) (1)
Innovation through regulation 0.7 -0.50 1.34 1.18
(rank, 1= highest) d (3) (4) (1) (2)
Regulatory and management 1.34 0.08 0.75 1.54
indicator e (2) (4) (3) (1)
Regulatory regime 1.205 0.035 1.623 1.087
index f (2) (4) (1) (3)
a Data of the measure ￿Stringency and consistency of environmental regulation,
in 2000￿ in WEF et al. (2001). b Ranking is based on authors assessment of
how much a country applies voluntary or economic instruments. c Data of the
measure ￿Transparency and stability of environmental regulation, in 1999￿ in WEF
et al. (2000). d Data based on measure ￿Degree to which environmental regulation
promotes innovation, measured in 2000￿ in WEF et al. (2001). e Data based on
￿Regulation and management indicator￿ in WEF et al. (2001) which comprises of
the measure ￿Stringency and consistency of environmental regulation, in 2000￿ in
WEF et al. (2001) as one component. f Data of the index is based on Esty and
Porter (2001). The index assesses stringency of standards, subsidies, regulatory
enforcement, regulatory structure, information and environmental institutions.
60Table 2: Data distribution and EMS certi￿cation across countries (out of
total of ￿rms in data set)
Year Germany Italy Netherlands UK Total
1995 Total 10 7 9 9 35
ISO 14001 1/10 0/7 1/8 0/9 2/34
1996 EMAS 3/10 0/7 0/8 1/9 4/34
Total EMS 3/10 0/7 1/8 1/9 5/34
ISO 14001 5/10 1/9 4/9 6/9 16/37
1997 EMAS 6/10 0/9 1/9 1/9 8/37
Total EMS 7/10 1/9 4/9 6/9 18/37
61Table 3: Environmental performance indicators used (all per tonne of paper
produced)
Indicators name De￿nition Relevance Unit Relevance
(MEPI, 2000) (MEPI, 2000) data sources
NOx emissions Emissions of Acidi￿cation, Kilo tonnes Environmental
(non-product NOx comprising local air per tonne reports veri￿ed
outputs to air both, NO pollution of paper under EMAS or
of nitrogen and NO2, per annum ISO, pollution
oxides) per measured inventories,
production output as NO2 surveys
SO2 emissions Emissions of Acidi￿cation, Tonnes
(non-product outputs sulphur dioxide local air per tonne
to air of sulphur from production pollution of paper As above
dioxide) per processes per annum
production output
COD emissions Annual chemically COD of waste water Tonnes
(non-product determined (before treatment) per tonne
outputs to water demand of measures the of paper
(before treatment) oxygen from potential to per annum As above
of chemical oxygen waste water cause waterway
demand, COD) per contaminants pollution from
production output discharged de-oxygenation
62Table 4: Separated estimation results for pooled (deviations from overall
means ) data for economic performance
Dependent variable ROCE a ROS b ROE c
Independent variable Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err.
Firm size 0.0688 0.0843 0.0531 0.037 0.3078 0.1295
Square of ￿rm size -0.008 0.0197 -0.0066 0.0087 -0.045 0.0303
SR_1 d 0.0226 0.0133 -0.0166 0.0052 -0.01 0.0182
Asset-turnover ratio -0.0418 0.0226 0.035 0.001 -0.0176 0.0349
Other sub-sector -0.0364 0.0818 0.0041 0.0271 0.0018 0.0949
Industrial sub-sector 0.0062 0.0526 0.0033 0.0202 -0.0227 0.0706
Mixed sub-sector -0.0026 0.0389 -0.0246 0.0176 -0.0164 0.0617
United Kingdom 0.1979 0.0524 0.0432 0.0232 0.2002 0.081
Italy 0.1117 0.0729 0.0267 0.0325 0.2542 0.1137
Netherlands 0.1003 0.0577 0.0634 0.0256 0.2427 0.0894
#obs. 69 78 78
a Return on capital employed; b return on sales; c return on equity; d inverse of
solvency ratio minus one. Bold and italic ￿gures mean signi￿cancy at 5% and 10%
level respectively.
63Table 5: Random eﬀects separated estimation results for economic per-
formance
Dependent variable ROCE a ROS b ROE c
Independent variable Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err.
Firm size 0.0706 0.1031 0.0383 0.0513 0.2725 0.1882
Square of ￿rm size -0.0069 0.0241 -0.0025 0.012 -0.0304 0.0442
SR_1 d 0.012 0.017 -0.024 0.0064 -0.0888 0.0275
Asset-turnover ratio -0.0468 0.0257 0.0104 0.0115 -0.0588 0.0383
Other sub-sector -0.0487 0.104 -0.0131 0.0447 -0.0864 0.1711
Industrial sub-sector 0.0256 0.0667 0.004 0.0315 0.0717 0.12
Mixed sub-sector -0.0014 0.0494 -0.0292 0.0291 -0.0101 0.111
United Kingdom 0.1985 0.0653 0.0542 0.0358 0.1838 0.1354
Italy 0.1214 0.0911 0.0443 0.0497 0.3007 0.1869
Netherlands 0.0941 0.0725 0.0566 0.0396 0.1396 0.1515
Full log-likelihood 12.66 86.5 -12.34
#obs. 69 78 78
Breusch-Pagan test e
￿ ￿rm eﬀect 0.2251 9.605 5.374
￿y e a re ﬀect 0.3389 0.4545 0.4158
￿ ￿rm & year eﬀects 0.564 10.06 5.789
a Return on capital employed; b return on sales; c return on equity; d inverse of
solvency ratio minus one; e Breusch and Pagan￿s (1980) test is a Lagrange-multiplier
test. Bold and italic ￿gures mean signi￿cancy at 5% and 10% level respectively.
64Table 6: Separated estimation results for pooled (deviations from overall




Independent variable Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err.
Firm size -1.584 1.613 6.576 5.659 -1.962 2.293
Square of ￿rm size 0.3827 0.3974 -1.81 1.377 0.6122 0.7321
Other sub-sector -0.3416 1.094 -3.849 3.764 0.5147 2.217
Industrial sub-sector 1.283 0.8628 -4.418 3.154 6.187 1.799
Mixed sub-sector 0.4239 0.9571 -6.824 3.449 11.93 1.761
United Kingdom 0.8729 0.9628 3.593 3.386 5.726 1.991
Italy -0.9709 1.22 3.094 5.28 -5.229 2.033
Netherlands -0.7865 0.9927 9.552 3.45 5.706 2.037
#obs. 81 72 78
a Emissions of nitrogen oxides per production output, b emissions of sulphur dioxide
per production output, c emissions of chemical oxygen demand per production
output. Bold and italic ￿gures mean signi￿cancy at 5% and 10% level respectively.





Independent variable Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err.
Firm size -1.384 1.889 5.542 5.388 -2.184 3.166
Square of ￿rm size 0.3403 0.4651 -1.557 1.308 0.5637 0.7725
Other sub-sector -0.3016 1.312 -4.023 3.811 0.3158 3.689
Industrial sub-sector 1.31 1.034 -4.543 3.197 6.047 2.955
Mixed sub-sector 0.439 1.147 -6.912 3.501 11.83 2.918
United Kingdom 0.9256 1.153 3.385 3.412 5.415 3.148
Italy -0.8898 1.449 2.645 5.29 -5.483 3.249
Netherlands -0.7206 1.185 9.283 3.463 5.421 3.239
Full log-likelihood -239.6 -252.2 -231.1
#obs. 81 72 78
Breusch-Pagan testd
￿ ￿rm eﬀect 1.05 67.76 60.97
￿y e a re ﬀect 0.14 1.429 1.146
￿ ￿rm & year eﬀects 1.19 69.19 62.12
a Emissions of nitrogen oxides per production output; b emissions of sulphur dioxide
per production output; c emissions of chemical oxygen demand per production
output; d Breusch and Pagan￿s (1980) test is a Lagrange-multiplier test. Bold and
italic ￿gures mean signi￿cancy at 5% and 10% level respectively.
66Table 8: Separated estimation results for the environmental index
(log(INDEX))
Pooled regression Random eﬀect regression
Independent variable Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err.
Firm size -0.9117 1.084 -0.4559 0.8553
Square of ￿rm size 0.0711 0.242 0.0168 0.1927
Other sub-sector 0.1239 0.9149 0.2184 1.413
Industrial sub-sector -0.8873 0.514 -0.758 0.769
Mixed sub-sector -1.245 0.5714 -1.132 0.8762
United Kingdom -2.832 0.6869 -2.505 0.8859
Italy 3.658 0.9681 4.082 1.21
Netherlands -0.2405 0.7002 0.0804 0.9028
Full log-likelihood ￿ -79.56
#obs. 57 57
Breusch-Pagan testa
￿ ￿rm eﬀect ￿ 48.25
￿y e a re ﬀect ￿ 1.403
￿ ￿rm & year eﬀects ￿ 49.66
a Breusch and Pagan￿s (1980) test is a Lagrange-multiplier test. Dependent vari-
able: log(INDEX). Bold and italic ￿gures mean signi￿cancy at 5% and 10% level
respectively.
67Table 9: Estimation results for simultaneous equations system for ROCE
and log(INDEX)
Equation ROCE a Log(INDEX) b
Variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Log(INDEX) 0.0914 0.0545 ￿ ￿
Square of log(INDEX) 0.0181 0.0084 ￿ ￿
ROCE ￿ ￿ 51.6494 38.2312
Square of ROCE ￿ ￿ -54.2385 41.4976
Firm size -0.1423 0.1138 -6.3224 4.9631
Square of ￿rm size 0.0296 0.0269 0.9328 0.923
SR_1 c 0.0564 0.0241 ￿ ￿
Asset-turnover ratio -0.0694 0.0416 ￿ ￿
Other sub-sector d ￿￿ ￿ ￿
Industrial sub-sector -0.0817 0.1028 ￿ ￿
Mixed sub-sector -0.0895 0.0701 ￿ ￿
United Kingdom ￿ ￿ -7.2846 3.9781
Italy ￿ ￿ -3.0111 5.2966
Netherlands ￿ ￿ -3.1919 2.7302
Intercept 0.0523 0.1082 -0.7123 3.2005
#obs. 51 51
F-stat. 1.234 1.7731
a Return on capital employed; b log of environmental index (INDEX), computed
a sd e s c r i b e di nS e c t i o n3 ;c inverse of solvency ratio minus one; d there are no
observations in this sub-sector. Endogenous variables: ROCE, log(INDEX), square
of ROCE, square of log(INDEX); exogenous variables: ￿rm size, square of ￿rm
size, SR_1, asset-turnover ratio, other sub-sector, industrial sub-sector, mixed sub-
sector, United Kingdom, Italy, Netherlands. Bold and italic ￿gures mean signi￿-
cancy at 5% and 10% level respectively.
68Table 10: Estimation results for simultaneous equations system for ROE
and log(INDEX)
Equation ROE a Log(INDEX) b
Variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Log(INDEX) 0.0243 0.0649 ￿ ￿
Square of log(INDEX) 0.0037 0.0093 ￿ ￿
ROE ￿ ￿ 15.67 14.4732
Square of ROE ￿ ￿ 4.0698 6.9357
Firm size 0.083 0.1273 -3.4321 7.5529
Square of ￿rm size -0.0094 0.0320 0.4101 1.3669
SR_1 c 0.0203 0.0237 ￿ ￿
Asset-turnover ratio -0.0201 0.0364 ￿ ￿
Other sub-sector 0.04 0.1271 ￿ ￿
Industrial sub-sector -0.1577 0.1029 ￿ ￿
Mixed sub-sector -0.1054 0.0708 ￿ ￿
United Kingdom ￿ ￿ -3.7089 4.1119
Italy ￿ ￿ 2.2596 5.9312
Netherlands ￿ ￿ -0.5373 4.246
Intercept 0.0506 0.1169 -2.9146 5.8569
#obs. 57 57
F-stat. 1.2063 5.6446
a Return on equity; b log of environmental index (INDEX) computed as described
in Section 3; c inverse of solvency ratio minus one. Endogenous variables: ROCE,
log(INDEX), square of ROCE, square of log(INDEX); exogenous variables: ￿rm
size, square of ￿rm size, SR_1, asset-turnover ratio, other sub-sector, industrial
sub-sector, mixed sub-sector, United Kingdom, Italy, Netherlands. Bold ￿gures
mean signi￿cancy at 5%.
69Table 11: Estimation results for simultaneous equations system for ROS and
log(INDEX)
Equation ROS a Log(INDEX) b
Variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Log(INDEX) -0.0089 0.0175 ￿ ￿
Square of log(INDEX) -0.0006 0.0025 ￿ ￿
ROS ￿ ￿ 13.1204 10.005
Square of ROS ￿ ￿ -81.5832 51.6915
Firm size 0.0069 0.0347 -0.7053 1.5067
Square of ￿rm size -0.0017 0.0084 0.0296 0.314
SR_1 c -0.00002 0.007 ￿ ￿
Asset-turnover ratio 0.0329 0.0131 ￿ ￿
Other sub-sector 0.0633 0.04 ￿ ￿
Industrial sub-sector -0.0586 0.0333 ￿ ￿
Mixed sub-sector -0.0681 0.0228 ￿ ￿
United Kingdom ￿ ￿ -2.1825 0.9803
Italy ￿ ￿ 3.8307 1.224
Netherlands ￿ ￿ 0.0173 0.9937
Intercept -0.0067 0.0359 -3.5637 1.3018
#obs. 57 57
F-stat. 4.068 11.1917
a Return on sales; b log of environmental index (INDEX), computed as described
in Section 3; c inverse of solvency ratio minus one;. Endogenous variables: ROCE,
log(INDEX), square of ROCE, square of log(INDEX); exogenous variables: ￿rm
size, square of ￿rm size, SR_1, asset-turnover ratio, other sub-sector, industrial
sub-sector, mixed sub-sector, United Kingdom, Italy, Netherlands. Bold and italic
￿gures mean signi￿cancy at 5% and 10% level respectively.
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